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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS RAY EDWARDS, A Minor, ) 
by and through his Guardian 
Ad Litem, EDWARD EDWARDS, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant ) 
Case No. 15730 
vs. ) 
ANN BEARD DIDERICKSEN, ) 
Defendant-Respondent ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the First Judicial District 
for Box Elder Cotmty, State of Utah, 
VeNoy Christofferson, Presiding. 
D. GARY CHRISTIAN and 
JAMES BLAKESLEY 
600 Commercial Club Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS RAY EDHARDS, a Hiner, 
by and through his r.uardian 
Ad Litem, FD'.'ARD EDVJARDS, 
Plaintiff-Apnellant 
vs. 
ANN BEARD DIDERICKSEN, 
Defendant-Resnondent: 
Case No. 15780 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a civil proceeding brought by the Appellant, 
Dennis Ray Edwards, a Minor, by and through his Guardian 
Ad Litem, Edward Edwards, to recover damages from Defend-
ant-Respondent for injuries inflicted upon his person in 
an automobile accident which occurred on the 24th day of. 
January, 1976. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOITER COURT 
In the District Court of the First Judicial District 
in and for Box Elder County, State of Utah, on March 9, 
1978, after a jury trial, the defendant was found by an 
8-person jury, voting 2 to 6, not to be negligent. Judgment 
was duly entered and recorded against the appellant, no 
cause of action, on the 27th day of Harch, 1978. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order of this Court reversin~ the 
judgment rendered at the trial of this case, and a ruling 
remanding the case to the trial court for a new trial. 
STATEHENT OF FACTS 
On January 24, 1976, the Apnellant and his brother, 
Danny, left their parent~' residence in Honeyville, Utah, 
to pick up Danny's girlfriend, Devon Taylor Peters, who 
lived near Thatcher in Beix Elder County. Danny was the 
owner and driver of the vehicle at all times relevant to 
this case. The Appellant and Devon were passengers. 
After picking up Devon, the three youths proceeded north 
on State Route 102, and approximately one and one-half (1-1/2) 
miles south of the Thatcher church on State Route 102, 
the Edwards vehicle was involved in a collision with 
another vehicle driven by the Respondent, Ann Beard 
Didericksen, while Respondent was attempting to negotiate 
a left turn from the highway into the driveway of her 
residence. 
Conflicting evidence was presented at the trial as 
to the cause of the accident. The Appellant contended 
that the accident was caused by the respondent negligently 
making a left turn directly in front of the Appellant's 
vehicle. Respondent contended that the accident was 
caused by the negligence of Danny Edwards, the driver of 
the vehicle, and by faulty equipment on the Edwards 
2 
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vehicle. All of the evidence was basically presented in 
the form of observations by the Appellant, his brother, 
the passenger, the Respondent, and two other lay witnesses 
who lived in the area. Only one witness testified at the 
trial who thoroughly investigated the accident, performed 
tests, took measurements, and evaluated data in an attempt 
to determine the cause of the accident. This was Officer 
l~arry For1sgren of the Utah Highway Patrol, who was quali-
fied by the Appellant, without objection by the Respondent, 
as an exrert in accident reconstruction. Following lengthy 
examination by counsel, Forsgren was asked what the cause 
of the accident was. Respondent's counsel objected and 
the objection was sustained by the court. In an in camera 
conference, the trial judge was advised by the Apnellant 
that the officer's testimony was vital to the Appellant's 
case in that it was anticiryated that he would testify 
that the Respondent's actions were the proximate cause 
of the accident. The cot;,rt, however, continued to refuse 
to allow the testimony. No other evidence was presented 
by the Respondent in an a,ttempt to refute any of the 
officer's calculations, but the jury was never allowed 
to hear his ultimate conclusion as to the cause of the 
accident. The jury votecl, 6 to 2, that the Respondent 
was not negligent, and therefore Appellant had no cause 
of action. 
3 
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ARGIBIBNT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ALLOH INTO EVIDENCE THE 
OPINION OF THE INVESTIGATING OFFICE!l AS TO THE CAUSE OF 
THE ACCIDENT WAS AN ABUS;~ OF DISCRETION A~D PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR. 
The Utah rule regarding admissibility of the opinions 
of expert witnesses has peen clearly and conclusively set 
forth in a number of Utah Supreme Court decisions. Two 
cases decided by the Court in the 1950s are generally 
cited as the controlling authority in the area. In the 
1953 casE?, Hooper vs. Gei;i.eral J~otors Corporation, 
260 P.2d 549, 123 U.515 (1953), a case involving damage 
sustained by the plaintiff and plaintiff's automobile 
allegedly due to a defective rear tire, the Court stated 
the following general rule: 
"Oninions as to the cause of a particular 
occurrence or accident given by witnesses 
possessing peculiar skill or knowledge that is, 
experts, are admissible where the subject matter 
is not one of common observation or knowledge, 
or in other words, where witnesses because of 
peculiar knowledge are competent to reach an 
intelligent conclusion and inexperienced persons 
are likelv to prove incapable of forming a 
correct judgment without skilled assistance." 
Id. at 552. 
In the Hooper case, the Court found that an expert 
witness can give his oninion as to causation if he is 
properly qualified as an expert, regardless of whether 
the opinion goes to the ultimate fact and issue in the 
case. 
4 
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In Joseph vs. W. H. Groves Latter Day Saints Hospital 
318 P.2d 330, 7 U.2d 39 (1957), the Court considered a 
wrongful death action against the LDS Hospital arising from 
an allegedly incompatible blood transfusion which created 
a kidney infection and caused death. In considering the 
opinion of an expert witness in the case, the Court made 
the following observation: 
"Phether the t1~stimony of an expert is as to 
the very issue before the jurv, is not a proper 
test as to its admi.:;sibilit:v. Hhere the subject of 
inquiry is in a field beyond the knowledge generally 
possessed by laymen, one nroperly qualified therein 
l"lay be nermitted to testify to his oninion as an 
expert. If the opinion evidence is such that it 
will aid the jury ip understanding their prqblems 
and lead them to the truth as to disputed issues 
of fact, it is comoetent and admissible, irrespective 
of ~1hether it bears directly upon the ultimate fact 
the jury is to determine." Id. at 334. 
Later cases have in:ornorated and reaffirmed standards 
set by He~ and Joseph. In Stagmeyer vs. Leatham Bros., Inc., 
439 P.2d 279, 20 U.2d 421 (1968), the Court determined 
that if an opinion of an exnert is otherwise competent 
and admissible, the fact that it bears directly upon the 
ultimate fact the jury must determine does not make it any 
less admissible. Id. at 281. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Part 2, states: 
"If a witness is testifying as an expert, 
testil"lonv of the witness in the form of opinions 
or inferences is limited to such ooinions as the 
judge finds are (a) based on facts or data per-
ceived bv or Personally known or made known to 
the witness at the hearing; and (b) within the 
scope of snecial knowledge, skill, experience or 
training possessed by the witness." 
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Subpart 4, Pule 56, states: 
"Testimony in the form of opinions or inferences 
otherwise admissible under these Rules is not 
objectionable because it embraces the ultimate 
issue or issues to be decided bv the trier of fact." 
Thus, both Utah case law and the Rules of Evidence 
clearly establish that if an individual is properly quali-
fied as an expert, and if that expert has had the oppor-
tunity to personally observe data or physical evidence that 
would be difficult, if not impossible, for a layman to 
thoroughly understand, then that expert may give his 
opinion regarding the ev:ldEmce, and that opinion may be 
given even though it emb;rac:es the ultimate issue before 
the court or the jury fo;r deteroination. 
As noted earlier in the Statement of Facts, the 
primary investigation of the collision which is the subject 
matter of this action wa@ performed by Officer Larry 
Fo:rsg·ren of the Utah Higbway Patrol. Officer Forsgren 
was callE!d as a witness on beha~f of the plaintiff in 
this action. (Tr. 139-216.) Officer ForsRren was ques-
tioned in some detail regarding his experience and his 
qualifications as an expert in the field of accident 
investigation. (Tr. 139-141.) These qualifications and 
Officer Forsgren's ability to prooerly investigate and 
interpret the physical evidence found at the scene of an 
accident were not challenged by Respondent's counsel. 
While Officer Forsgren was not personally present at the 
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time of the accident, he arrived shortly thereafter and 
oerforrned a number of te~:ts and measurements as a part of 
his investigation. After exnlaining the various procedures 
used to investigate and e,valuate the accident and the 
accident scene, Officer Forsgren (Tr. 189) was asked if 
he had an opinion as to what was the cause of the accident. 
His response was yes. (Tr. 190) When asked to give that 
opinion to the jury, counsel for Respondent objected to 
the answer and the objection was sustained. The objection 
was directed towards Officer Forsgren giving an opinion 
0n a matter that went to the ultimate issue and fact in 
the case. In chambers, both counsel argued the point 
further, and the judge clearly ruled that it would be 
inadmissible in this situation for the Officer to give 
his opinion as to the cause of the accident, as it was 
the ultimate issue and fact in the case, and therefore 
solely the province of the jury. 
The Court should take careful note that there was 
no issue raised as to whether the tests and procedures 
used by the Officer in investigating the accident were 
correct or accurate. Apparently, counsel for the Respond-
ent agreed that the investigation of the accident was 
thorough and comprehensive. There was also no objection 
made to Officer Forsgren's qualifications as an expert 
in accident reconstruction. No other expert testimony 
was presented concerning the data that was gathered at 
7 
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the time of the accident. Therefore, the only issue for 
decision in this case is whether an exnert witness who 
formulates an opinion as to the cause of an accident after 
conducting a thorouRh investigation of the situation, 
should be allowed to give that opinion to the jury. 
The only possible argument against admissibility in 
this case in lieu of the great weight of case authority 
is whether this is a situation that a layman or a .iuror 
would find it difficult to understanding all of the calcu-
lations and computations necessary in formulating a 
conclusion as to causation. 
It is clear that accident investigation is a very 
specialized field. Police officers and highway patrolmen 
go through extensive training in order to learn the proper 
methods of evaluating stress points, measuring and 
evaluating the skid marks, measuring and evaluating points 
of impact, and measuring and evaluating contusions and 
concussions created on the various cars indicating points 
of impact and speed. These are areas that are difficult for 
layrnent to understand, therefore the opinion of an expert 
regarding his overall evaluation of all of these items 
would be extremely helpful to a jury in arriving at a 
decision as to ~ho was a1~ fault in an automobile accident. 
The court's failure to let the expert witness give 
his opinion as to causation in this case was extremely 
prejudicial to Appellant's case. Obviously, the jury 
8 
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was divided as to Resoondent's negligence. It is highly 
probable that the expert witness' opinion that Respondent 
caused the accident would have resulted in a verdict in 
Appellant's favor. This was the most critical testimony 
of Appellant's case and nothing could have been more 
prejudicial to Appellant's case than its exclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
The law in Utah regarding the admissibility of the 
opinion of an exoert witness regarding issues that go to 
the ultLnate decision that must be made by the jury has 
been clearly set forth by case law and by the Utah Rules 
of evidence. In this ca~e. Judge Christofferson did not 
allow Officer Larry Forsgrem to give his expert opinion 
as to the cause of the accident. '1r. Forsgren was estab-
lished as an expert, his qualifications were outlined 
for the jury's consideration, no objection was made to 
these qualifications, no attempt was made by Respondent 
to out on indenendent experts that disagreed with Officer 
Forsgren's findings, no challenge was made as to the 
type of tests, analyses, or computations made by Officer 
Forsgren. The only obiection came at the point that 
Officer Forsgren was asked to give his opinion as to 
the cause of the accident. Utah law clearly indicates 
that an expert, once qualified as an expert, is entitled 
to give his oninion in areas where it would be helpful 
to the jury to receive such an opinion, even though that 
9 
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ooinion may indicate who was ultimately at fault in the 
case. 
The exclusion of the officer's opinion was clearly 
prejudicial to Anoe llant '1 s case. The judge connni tted 
prejudicial error in not permitting the Officer's opinion 
as to causation to be received by the jury. In light of 
the weight of case authority to the contrary, the decision 
was a breach of judicial discretion. 
For these reasons, Appellant respectfully requests 
that the judgment of the court below be reversed and the 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF HEBER 
SS. 
Cornes now DONNA CZEKALA, being first duly sworn 
upon her oath, and deooses and states that she mailed a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Apoellant's Brief 
to the following persons 
D. GARY Cl!RJ STIAN, ESO. , 
Attornev at Law 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JAf~S BLAKESLEY, ESO. 
Attornev at Law 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111 
on this 19th day of September, 1978. 
.'(:T 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /if' day of 
September, 1978. 
Hy Commission Expires: 
~~);?;&,, 
NOTARY PUBL m._;~_,.,.. / -/ 
Residing at: ,_,_, y~ _ .> u/~ 
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